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Abstract
I examine the standard New Keynesian model augmented with product entry and
exit. The statistical agency in the model measures product entry with a delay. Conse-
quently, measured inflation departs from true, utility-based inflation. I show that the gap
between measured inflation and true inflation is serially correlated and varies with the
state of the economy. This result contrasts with the common assumption of white-noise
exogenous measurement error. True inflation is more volatile and less persistent than
measured inflation, and the correlation between true inflation and true output is lower
than the correlation between measured inflation and measured output. Furthermore, I
analyze monetary policy given the measurement problem.
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1 Introduction
A key message of the New Keynesian model is that optimal monetary policy should
stabilize inflation. In this model, inflation is defined as the change in the minimum
expenditure to buy a certain amount of utility. I will refer to this inflation as “true
inflation”. The problem with the policy prescription is that, in practice, a central bank
does not observe true inflation. In practice, the central bank observes consumer-price
inflation measured by a statistical agency, or “measured inflation”. Measured inflation
is the expenditure to buy a certain basket of products at current prices relative to the
expenditure to buy the same basket at past prices.
Broda and Weinstein (2007) study the dataset which underlies U.S. consumer-price
(CPI) inflation. The dataset is maintained by the U.S. Bureau of Labor Statistics
(BLS). Broda and Weinstein argue that inflation is measured with error because the
BLS measures product entry with a delay. Broda and Weinstein define measurement
bias (MB) in inflation as measured inflation divided by true inflation. They find that
MB is serially correlated and pro-cyclical. This finding contrasts with each of the two
common assumptions concerning inflation mismeasurement: constant error, and white-
noise exogenous error.1
In this paper, I assess the effects of MB for monetary policy. I examine the standard
New Keynesian model augmented with product entry and exit. The statistical agency
in the model measures product entry with a delay when it compiles measured inflation.
Products enter and exit the market at the same exogenous rate such that product
variety remains constant. When a firm enters the market, it choses the price for its
product. Thereafter, the firm adjusts its price with a given probability in each period.
I show that, in line with the evidence, the gap between measured inflation and true
inflation in this model is serially correlated and pro-cyclical.
Specifically, measured inflation is less volatile than true inflation. The reason is
that measured inflation lacks some price changes which are contained in true inflation.
1Among others, Boskin, Dulberger, Gordon, Griliches, and Jorgenson (1997) analyze constant error
in inflation, and Svensson and Woodford (2003) assume white-noise exogenous error to study monetary
policy under imperfect information.
1
In each period, true inflation records prices of all products available in the market.
Therefore, true inflation routinely compares prices of products that have disappeared
at the end of the previous period to prices of products that are new in the current
period. Prices of new products generally differ from prices of discontinued products
such that product turnover adds many price changes to true inflation. In contrast,
measured inflation compares the current prices of products in a particular basket to
past prices of the same products. Therefore, measured inflation does not contain the
price changes that result from product turnover.
Furthermore, measured inflation is more persistent than true inflation. The reason
is that measured inflation downplays price spells with short durations. Entry truncates
the price spells of new products such that, by lacking new products, measured inflation
underestimates the relative frequency of short price spells. Overall, measured inflation
contains a smaller number and a different sample of price changes than true inflation.
MB varies with the state of the economy because differences in the composition of both
inflation rates matter most when price changes are large, and the size of a price change
depends on the state of the economy. Technically, measured inflation depends on true
inflation and lags of true inflation.
Bils (2004) argues that any MB in U.S. CPI inflation shows up as opposite bias
in real output growth because U.S. National Income and Product Accounts (NIPA)
deflate nominal output growth by measured inflation. I replicate this approach in the
model and find that measured output equals true output plus true inflation and lags
of true inflation. The MB in output is serially correlated and varies with the state of
the economy like the MB in inflation.
One implication of MB in inflation, which spills over into output, is that the correla-
tion of true inflation and true output is lower than the correlation of measured inflation
and measured output. The reason is that inflation and output are not measured in the
data in the same way in which inflation and output are measured in typical business-
cycle models. The finding matters because business-cycle models are often evaluated
by comparing the correlation of inflation and output in the model one-to-one to the
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correlation of inflation and output in the data. My model suggests that this way of
evaluating business-cycle models is appropriate only after accounting for endogenous
MB.
In order to assess the effect of MB for monetary policy I consider the policy problem
of a central bank which, by assumption, does not know true inflation and the true
output gap. I find that, across monetary-policy regimes, the central bank stabilizes
inflation insufficiently because of MB. When the statistical agency computes measured
output, it wrongly attributes a fraction of true inflation to true output. This fraction
of true inflation receives too little weight in the policy rule so long as the central bank
responds more to inflation than to the output gap. Insufficient inflation stabilization
deteriorates welfare.
When the central bank acts under discretion, MB leads to welfare improvements
despite insufficient inflation stabilization. By targeting measured inflation the central
bank effectively responds to true inflation and lags of true inflation. Furthermore, lags
of true inflation enter the policy rule if the central bank targets the measured output
gap. Thus, in terms of true variables, the policy rule exhibits history dependence even
though the central bank is discretionary. The history dependence improves the tradeoff
between stabilizing inflation or the output gap, and improves welfare.
Similar mechanisms are at work when the central bank pursues an interest-rate rule
that is formulated in terms of measured output and measured inflation. By targeting
measured variables, effectively, the central bank responds to true output, true inflation,
and lags of true inflation. Accordingly, when true inflation is low the interest rate is
expected to remain low for a longer period of time because the effective policy rule
features lags of true inflation. Low expected interest rates increase current output
which offsets some of the decline in inflation. Thus, the tradeoff between stabilizing
inflation or the output gap improves, and so does welfare.
The literature, which studies monetary policy under imperfect information, typi-
cally assumes that the difference between true and measured variables is a white-noise
exogenous process. I argue that this difference is not represented well by a white-noise
3
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exogenous process if we take seriously the notion that mismeasurement is due to mis-
takes made by the statistical agency. I show that whether the difference between true
and measured variables is modelled as white-noise exogenous process or as endogenous
MB matters for how imperfect information on the part of the central bank affects
monetary policy. Specifically, I reconsider the policy problem of a discretionary central
bank which does not know true inflation and the true output gap assuming that true
variables are perturbed by a white-noise exogenous process. In this case, monetary
policy does not suffer from insufficient inflation stabilization, the effective policy rule
does not feature additional states, and welfare deteriorates rather than improves.
With few exceptions, the empirical literature on MB in inflation has confined itself
to identify constant biases and to quantify them econometrically. My analysis identi-
fies and quantifies a time-varying and endogenous MB in inflation. My methodological
contribution is to examine MB in inflation in a dynamic stochastic general-equilibrium
(DSGE) model. The general-equilibrium model allows tracing out the effects of endoge-
nous MB for monetary policy. Also, the paper contributes to the literature on the role
of product entry and exit for monetary policy.
Bilbiie, Ghironi, and Melitz (2007) and Bergin and Corsetti (2008) study mon-
etary policy in models with endogenous product entry and imperfect adjustment of
product prices. Endogenous entry is a step towards realism as compared to exogenous
entry. However, the formulation of imperfect price-adjustment in both papers implies
a collapsed cross-section distribution of prices such that product prices coincide in
equilibrium. A collapsed price distribution precludes any MB which originates a non-
representative sample of price changes. In the model with exogenous entry, I derive a
non-collapsed cross-section distribution of prices and show how important moments of
this distribution evolve over time. Weber (2009) analyzes how endogenous firm entry
affects the cross-section distribution of prices and monetary policy.
Shapiro and Wilcox (1996), Boskin, Dulberger, Gordon, Griliches, and Jorgenson
(1997), Lebow and Rudd (2003), Gordon (2006), and Lebow and Rudd (2006) review
and add to the empirical literature on MB in inflation but focus on constant biases.
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Broda and Weinstein (2007) argue that it is the high quality of new products which
drives the MB they estimate. They derive that new products tend to be of higher
quality than established products. Since the CPI records new products with a delay
it lacks low quality-adjusted prices and, thus, overstates the exact index. Their MB is
pro-cyclical because product entry is pro-cyclical in their data. The endogenous MB
considered here is independent of product quality and pro-cyclical product entry.
Whereas I argue that it is measured CPI inflation which underestimates the number
of price changes, Nakamura and Steinsson (2008b) quantify the same bias in import and
export prices empirically. Orphanides (2001) shows that real-time macro data undergo
major revisions over time until all statistical information has arrived. In contrast, macro
data remain contaminated by the endogenous MB considered in this paper even after
data are revised finally.
The paper is structured as follows. I set out the model in section 2, analyze MB in
section 3, and describe the calibration of parameters in section 4. Section 5 considers the
monetary-policy problem given endogenous MB, and section 6 compares the monetary-
policy effects of endogenous MB with those of white-noise exogenous measurement
error. Section 7 contains three applications of the model to quantify MB and its effects
in U.S. data, and section 8 concludes.
2 Model
I consider a minimal setup with exogenous product entry and exit to convey implica-
tions of endogenous MB. A special case of the model is the standard New-Keynesian
model without product entry and exit in Woodford (2003) and Gal´ı (2008).
2.1 Household
The representative household maximizes expected discounted lifetime utility,
max
{Ct(j),Bt,Lt}∞t=0
E0
∞∑
t=0
βt [u(Ct, ξt)− h(Lt)] , β ∈ (0, 1) . (1)
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Let Ct denote composite consumption at time t, Lt labor hours and E0 the expectation
operator conditional on information at time zero. The function u(Ct, ξt) is twice con-
tinuously differentiable, increasing in Ct, and concave for each value of the mean-zero
preference shock ξt. The function h(Lt) is twice continuously differentiable, increasing
in Lt, and convex. Utility maximization is subject to the budget constraint,
∫ 1
0
Pt(j)Ct(j) dj +Bt = (1 + it−1)Bt−1 +WtLt +Dt . (2)
The household consumes quantity Ct(j) of product j at price Pt(j). It receives nom-
inal returns from past bond holdings (1 + it−1)Bt−1, nominal labor income WtLt and
nominal dividends Dt from firm ownership. Wt and it denote the nominal wage rate
and the nominal interest rate, respectively. The household bundles all products j to
composite consumption as in Dixit and Stiglitz (1977),
Ct =
(∫ 1
0
Ct(j)
θ−1
θ dj
) θ
θ−1
, θ > 1 . (3)
The parameter θ denotes the elasticity of substitution between any two products. The
utility-based or true price level Pt is the minimum expenditure to buy one unit of Ct,
P 1−θt =
∫ 1
0
Pt(j)
1−θdj, and rearranges to
Pt =
∫ 1
0
Ct(j)
Ct
Pt(j) dj (4)
after substituting household demand for product j, Ct(j)/Ct = (Pt(j)/Pt)
−θ. True in-
flation is the change in the true price level, pit = Pt/Pt−1. Appendix A.1 collects the
conditions which ensure optimal intertemporal household choices.
2.2 Firms
Measuring the price level Pt is a trivial task if all products sell at an identical price.
In this case, observing the price of any single product reveals the aggregate price level.
Identical product prices is the assumption adopted by related papers. In practice, price
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level measurement is a challenging task because the cross-section distribution of prices
does not collapse to a single price. I add a non-collapsed price distribution to the model
by assuming that price adjustment is a variant of the mechanism in Calvo (1983). When
a firm enters the market it sets a price for its product. In subsequent periods, the firm
adjusts its price with probability (1− α), α ∈ [0, 1), in each period until exit.
Firm entry and exit is exogenous. Each period, there is a unit mass of firms. Firms
are indexed by j ∈ [0, 1]. At the beginning of each period, δ ∈ [0, 1) new firms enter
the economy. At the end of each period, a fraction δ of firms exits the market. Exiting
firms are selected randomly. Accordingly, the unit interval comprises δ new firms and
(1 − δ) established firms in each period. The entry and exit setup is a special case of
the setup in Bilbiie, Ghironi, and Melitz (2006).
Firm j produces quantity Yt(j) with technology Yt(j) = Atf(Lt(j)) and labor input
Lt(j). The function f(.) is increasing and concave. Productivity At > 0 is an exogenous
stochastic process with mean A¯ = 1. The firm assembles only one product such that
the index j also identifies the product of the firm. The firm hires labor on a competitive
factor market and sells its product on a monopolistically competitive product market.
When a firm (either new or established) sets its price, the firm solves
max
Pt(j)
Et
∞∑
s=t
(κβ)s−t Ωs,t
[
Pt(j)Ys(j)−Wsf−1
(
Ys(j)
At
)]
, (5)
subject to household demand Yt(j)/Yt = (Pt(j)/Pt)
−θ. The parameter κ = α(1− δ) is
the probability to survive into the next period and to produce at old price. There-
fore, the higher is the probability of exit δ, the higher is the effective rate at which
the firm discounts future profits. The variable Ωs,t = uc(Cs, ξs)Pt/(uc(Ct, ξt)Ps) denotes
the stochastic household discount-factor for nominal payoffs. The solution of the max-
imization problem (5), stated in appendix A.2, reveals that all (re)optimizing firms set
the same price P ?t .
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2.3 Statistical Agency
Inflation as measured by the statistical agency is the change in expenditure required
to buy a particular basket of products. The basket lacks new products because the
statistical agency measures product entry with a delay. Measured inflation corresponds
to Laspeyre’s index which weights current and past prices of products in the basket
by constant quantities. Let measured inflation equal the ratio of measured price levels,
pimt = P
m
t,t/P
m
t−1,t, with
Pmt,t =
∫
N (t,`)
Pt(j)Q(j) dj , P
m
t−1,t =
∫
N (t,`)
Pt−1(j)Q(j) dj . (6)
Price Pt(j) is weighted by the constant quantity Q(j). The first subscript of P
m
t,t refers to
the dating of prices whereas the second subscript indicates the definition of the basket
N (t, `). The basket comprises all products with a sufficiently long lifetime ` ≥ 1,
N (t, `) = { all products j available at time t with a lifetime greater than ` } .
Within each period, the statistical agency revises N (t, `) to prevent the coverage of
the basket from shrinking over time. The revision involves phasing in newer products
and phasing out discontinued ones. Whereas a product is phased in `+ 1 periods after
market entry, a discontinued product is phased out in the period after exit because its
price is no longer observed.2
Between periods, the basket remains constant. Accordingly, the basket contains
prices of the same product in two consecutive periods, and the statistical agency can
compute product-specific inflation rates. Put differently, measured inflation is based
on a matched-model index in which all price comparisons are for the same products.
2Within-period revision of the basket implies that two estimates of the price level Pmt,t and P
m
t,t+1
exist at time t. The first estimate refers to the basket at time t, whereas the second estimate refers to
the basket at time t+ 1. Numerically, the difference between both estimates is small. The standard
deviation of the price-level revision equals std(Pˆmt,t − Pˆmt,t+1) = α`δ/(1− α(1− δ)) std(pˆit) up to first
order and the calibration adopted below implies α`δ/(1− α(1− δ)) = 0.0172. In practice, revisions of
the CPI are minor, too.
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Hence, measured inflation can be rearranged to
pimt =
∫
N (t,`)
wmt−1,t(j)pit(j) dj , (7)
where pit(j) = Pt(j)/Pt−1(j) is product-specific inflation. Measured weights
wmt−1,t(j) =
Pt−1(j)Q(j)∫
N (t,`) Pt−1(j)Q(j) dj
, 1 =
∫
N (t,`)
wmt−1,t(j) dj , (8)
denote measured expenditure spent on product j and integrate to unity.
In practice, statistical agencies continuously revise the CPI basket similar to the
period-by-period revision in the model. Sample rotation is the main method of the BLS
to maintain coverage of the U.S. CPI basket. In every year, the CPI basket is revised
for 20% to 25% of the geographic area by attaching positive instead of zero weight
to prices of newer products such as to better reflect recent developments in consumer
expenditure in that particular area. The entire basket rotates once every four to five
years (Armknecht, Lane, and Stewart (1997)).3
However, updated weights are usually outdated by one, two, or more years at the
time when they are employed in the CPI (Lane (2000)). One reason for delay is that
sample rotation implies delayed recording of new products in those parts of the basket
which have not been updated. Further delays arise from the need to estimate weights of
new products by consumer-expenditure surveys; from averaging expenditure data over
several periods to mitigate seasonality and idiosyncratic shocks; or, more generally, from
limited funds and resources to track market trends more closely.4 In the model, the
parameter which captures the time lag between market launch and basket introduction
of a new product is `.
3In addition, the CPI basket is updated for new products in base periods but such periods are
infrequent events. In base periods, weights attached to product prices are revised. Historically, several
years pass between base periods. For instance, the U.S. historical record of base-period revisions is
1940, 1953, 1964, 1978, 1987 and 1998. Moreover, until 1998 weights were usually outdated by roughly
three years when they entered the base period revision. Starting with 2002 weights are updated
biannually (table 1 in BLS (1997), chapter 17).
4New products could enter the CPI independent from sample rotation when a discontinued product
must be replaced. However, Lane (2000) argues that, in practice, a discontinued product is replaced
by a product almost as obsolete as the discontinued product to avoid subjective quality adjustment.
CPI procedures instruct data collectors to select a product for replacement that is most comparable
to the discontinued product. Such practice tends to keep new products out of the CPI.
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An important feature of BLS’s sample-rotation method is overlap pricing which
means that the BLS collects prices for both the updated and the outdated sample in
the month in which the outdated sample is replaced (Armknecht, Lane, and Stewart
(1997)). In that month, CPI inflation records price changes for products in the outdated
sample. In the subsequent month, however, CPI inflation records price changes for
products in the updated sample. Accordingly, when the BLS computes CPI inflation it
never compares current prices of updated products to past prices of outdated products.
Measured inflation in the model is consistent with overlap pricing because measured
inflation also matches product-models.
In setting up the model, I have assumed that firms and households know true
aggregate variables whereas the statistical authority, and hence the central bank, does
not know these variables. Even though this assumption is often adopted in the literature
on monetary policy under imperfect information, the assumption is not realistic in that
it ignores information deficiencies on the part of firms and households. I nevertheless
maintain this assumption because it is useful to isolate the effects of MB, which emerge
when monetary policy responds to mismeasured variables, from the effects of MB, which
emerge when firms and households base their decisions on mismeasured variables.
3 Analyzing Measurement Bias
I define MB as measured inflation divided by true inflation. True inflation is a natural
benchmark to judge the accuracy of measured inflation because optimal monetary
policy in microfounded models suggests that true inflation follows a particular path.
MB as defined here is the link which allows to extrapolate this path to measured
inflation. Also, my definition of MB is compatible with the definition adopted by the
empirical literature on constant MB.
10
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3.1 Conservative Inflation
To understand MB, it is useful to introduce the concept of conservative inflation. Con-
sider a hypothetical household which is conservative in that it consumes established
products only. More precisely, conservative consumption Cnt,t corresponds to compos-
ite (3) but is defined over the subset N (t, `) of products rather than over all products.
The conservative household minimizes costs and obtains the price of Cnt,t as
P nt,t =
(∫
N (t,`)
Pt(j)
1−θ dj
) 1
1−θ
. (9)
The first subscript of P nt,t refers to product prices whereas the second subscript indicates
the definition of N (t, `). Conservative product demand is Cnt,t(j)/Cnt,t = (Pt(j)/P nt,t)−θ.
Parallel to measured inflation, I define conservative inflation as pint = P
n
t,t/P
n
t−1,t and
rearrange it as
pint =
(∫
N (t,`)
wnt−1,t(j) pit(j)
1−θ dj
) 1
1−θ
. (10)
Weights wnt−1,t(j) equal relative conservative expenditure and integrate to unity,
wnt−1,t(j) =
Pt−1(j) Cnt−1,t(j)
P nt−1,tC
n
t−1,t
, 1 =
∫
N (t,`)
wnt−1,t(j) dj . (11)
3.2 Partitioning Measurement Bias
I denote MB as Bt = pimt /pit and augment it with conservative inflation,
Bt = [pimt /pint ]× {pint /pit} = [Bsubt ]× {Bnewt } . (12)
MB Bt partitions into substitution bias Bsubt and new-product bias Bnewt .
The substitution bias equals measured inflation divided by conservative inflation.
Both inflation rates record price changes for products in N (t, `) only. When relative
product prices change conservative inflation accounts for the fact that a household,
which minimizes costs, substitutes cheap products for expensive ones.5 Measured in-
5To see the point formally rearrange Pnt,t as P
n
t,t =
∫
N (t,`)(Pt(j)/P
n
t,t)
−θ Pt(j) dj. When Pt(j) is
11
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flation cannot capture such substitutions because quantities attached to prices remain
fixed. Accordingly, the substitution bias arises because measured inflation overstates
conservative inflation.
The new-product bias equals conservative inflation divided by true inflation. Both
inflation rates capture substitution into cheap products when relative prices change.
However, whereas conservative inflation records price changes of products in N (t, `),
true inflation records price changes of all products in the market. Accordingly, the new-
product bias arises because the statistical agency tracks a nonrepresentative sample of
products.
I approximate MB in equation (12) up to first-order around a steady-state in which
firms set flexible prices and true inflation is equal to unity. The optimality condition
to the firm’s problem (5) implies that all firms set the same price when prices are
flexible. Symmetry in prices jointly with the assumption of homogenous quantities
Q(j) = 1/(1− δ)` implies a steady-state free of MB such that all inflation rates coincide
in steady-state. Accordingly, the model abstracts from the constant MB in inflation
that has been studied extensively in the empirical literature. It is straightforward to
show existence and uniqueness of the steady-state. In what follows, a variable with a
hat .ˆ indicates percentage deviation from steady-state.
Substitution Bias
Proposition 1: The substitution bias defined in equation (12) is zero up to first order.
Proof: See appendix B.1. The first-order approximation of pimt in equation (7)
uses the fact that, for each j in N (t, `), the term wmt−1,t(j)pit(j) is approximately equal
to wˆmt−1,t(j)+ pˆit(j) times a constant. The integral over weights wˆ
m
t−1,t(j) is equal to zero
because the integral over weights wmt−1,t(j) (in levels) equals unity. Therefore, weights
do not matter for pimt up to first order. The same argument applies to pi
n
t in equation
(10) such that the difference between the weights in measured and in conservative
larger than Pnt,t, the relative quantity of product j, Ct(j)/C
n
t,t = (Pt(j)/P
n
t,t)
−θ, falls.
12
Henning Weber
inflation does not matter up to first order. The remaining difference between pimt and
pint is curvature which is suppressed by the first-order approximation.
Related to the result here, Hausman (2003) demonstrates the second-order character
of the substitution bias in a two-period setup without new products. Proposition 1
implies that the new-product bias Bˆnewt is equal to the total bias Bˆt up to first order.
New-Product Bias
Before deriving the new-product bias I prove a result on the true price level.
Proposition 2: The true price level (4) has the following recursive representation,
P 1−θt = (1− κ)(P ?t )1−θ + κP 1−θt−1 , (13)
denoting with P ?t the optimal price at date t and κ = α(1− δ).
For a proof I employ two relationships. First, the unit mass of firms is composed of
infinitely many entry cohorts,
1 =
−∞∑
s=t
(1− δ)t−sδ . (14)
Each cohort has size δ in the entry period but diminishes in size over time due to firm
exit. The second relationship describes the average price of a particular cohort of firms.
Let the integer s ≤ t be common to all firms which entered the market at time s. Under
Calvo-pricing and at time t, product prices maintained by firms in cohort s follow a
truncated geometric distribution with average price
Λt(s) =

(1− α)∑s+1k=t αt−k(P ?k )1−θ + αt−s(P ?s )1−θ if s < t
(P ?t )
1−θ if s = t .
(15)
Here, the size of cohort s is normalized to unity.
13
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The true price level is equal to the sum over the average prices Λt(s) of all cohorts
s after weighting each average price with the size of cohort s at time t. Thus, equations
(14) and (15) deliver
P 1−θt =
∫ 1
0
Pt(j)
1−θ dj =
−∞∑
s=t
(1− δ)t−sδ Λt(s) .
which can be rearranged as P 1−θt = (1− κ)
∑∞
i=0 κ
i(P ?t−i)
1−θ. The recursive representa-
tion of P 1−θt stated in the proposition follows straight.
Proposition 2 generalizes the result that the price level evolves recursively in the
New-Keynesian model without entry and exit to the case of a New-Keynesian model
with entry and exit. Entry and exit δ > 0 implies that the weight (1− α(1− δ))
attached to the current optimal price P ?t in the true price level increases.
Proposition 3: The new-product bias defined in equation (12) is a one-sided,
finite-order, invertible linear filter of true inflation up to a first-order approximation,
Bˆnewt = (a(L)− 1)pˆit . (16)
L denotes the lag operator. The lag polynomial a(L) is defined as
a(L) =

1−α
1−α(1−δ)L
0 + (1−α)δ
1−α(1−δ)
∑`−1
s=1(αL)
s if ` ≥ 2
1−α
1−α(1−δ)L
0 if ` = 1 .
The sum of coefficients fulfills a(1) = 1 if α = 0, δ = 0, or both. If 0 < α < 1 and
0 < δ < 1 then 0 < a(1) < 1.
Proof: See appendix B.2 and appendix B.4. The new-product bias is a weighted
average of true inflation and lags of true inflation. In general, the bias varies over time
despite the fact that product entry and exit is exogenous and time-invariant. The time
lag ` at which the statistical agency measures new products determines the order of
a(L).
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I mention two special cases of a new-product bias equal to zero before delving deeper
into the properties of a(L). First, without entry and exit (δ = 0) delayed recording of
new products is irrelevant. Second, if prices are flexible (α = 0) all products sell at an
identical price such that observing any product price is sufficient to infer the true price
level.
3.3 Measured Inflation and True Inflation
To obtain a mapping between measured inflation and true inflation I linearize the
definition of the new-product bias Bnewt = pint /pit, substitute the first-order relationship
pˆint = pˆi
m
t from proposition 2, and obtain pˆi
m
t = Bˆnewt + pˆit. Finally, I substitute equa-
tion (16).
Proposition 4: Up to first order, measured inflation is a one-sided, finite-order,
invertible linear filter of true inflation,
pˆimt = a(L)pˆit . (17)
I illustrate the mapping between measured inflation and true inflation by partitioning
true (measured) inflation into the fraction of price spells, which terminate in period t,
times a weighted average over all terminated price spells with different durations s,
pˆit = (1− κ)
[
(1− κ)
∞∑
s=1
κs−1(Pˆ ?t − Pˆ ?t−s)
]
,
pˆimt = (1− α)
[
(1− α)
`−1∑
s=1
αs−1(Pˆ ?t − Pˆ ?t−s) + (α/κ)`−1 (1− κ)
∞∑
s=`
κs−1(Pˆ ?t − Pˆ ?t−s)
]
.
(18)
True inflation pˆit records a total of (1−κ) terminated price spells plus κ ongoing spells
which do not contribute to true inflation. The term in square brackets states that
(1− κ) terminated spells last one period, (1− κ)κ last two periods, and so on. These
15
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coefficients denote relative frequencies and add up to unity.6
Partitions (18) differ in two respects. First, measured inflation underestimates the
total number of terminated spells indicating (1− α) instead of (1− κ) terminations.
To understand this difference, compare the cross-section distributions of prices of two
particular product cohorts. The first cohort constitutes all products which left the
market at time t− 1. Its price distribution replicates the market price-distribution at
time t− 1 because exiting products are drawn randomly. The second cohort constitutes
all products which are new at time t. The price distribution of this cohort collapses at
the optimal price. Because many different prices (those of exiting products) switch to
the same price (that of new products), true inflation records δ terminated price spells
from product turnover.
In contrast, measured inflation aggregates product-specific inflation rates which
compare prices of the same products. Accordingly, measured inflation ignores the price
changes, which result from product turnover, and underestimates the total number of
price changes. Empirically, Nakamura and Steinsson (2008b) show that the same bias
occurs in import and export price-indices which link in new products on a matched-
model basis.
[Figure 1 about here.]
The second respect in which partitions (18) differ is that measured inflation down-
plays the relative frequencies of price spells with short durations. The top panel of
figure 1 plots relative frequencies of price spells with durations s (the coefficients in
square brackets of (18)) for both true and measured inflation. Evidently, measured
inflation shifts weight to price spells with long durations when compared to true infla-
tion. The reason is that entry truncates the price spells of new products. Accordingly,
when the statistical agency misses new products it overemphasizes price spells with
long durations.
6All price spells with a duration s display the same price change Pˆ ?t − Pˆ ?t−s because firms adjust
to a single price. In practice, price spells with the same duration and the same termination date need
not display the same price change. The partition of measured inflation applies for ` ≥ 2. If instead
` = 1 the first sum in measured inflation disappears and pˆimt ∝ pˆit.
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Naturally, the filter a(L) reflects both differences among inflation rates. True in-
flation affects measured inflation less than one-to-one (recall that a(1) < 1) because
measured inflation records less terminated price spells. Yet, a(L) attaches positive co-
efficients to past true inflation rates because measured inflation overemphasizes price
spells with long durations.
The spectrum of measured inflation, Spim , and the spectrum of true inflation, Spi,
are related according to
Spim($) = a(e
−i$)a(ei$) Spi($) ,
because a(L) is invertible (Hamilton (1994), chapter 6). Here $ denotes the frequency
and i =
√−1. The bottom panel of figure 1 plots the ratio of spectra Spim/Spi = a(.)a(.)
across frequencies. MB emphasizes low frequencies in true inflation. For quarterly data
horizons longer than roughly three years receive more weight. Furthermore, MB damp-
ens the variation of measured inflation across all frequencies because the ratio of spectra
remains below unity. Taken together, MB increases inflation persistence and dampens
inflation volatility. Accordingly, measured inflation is more persistent but less volatile
than true inflation.
3.4 True Output, Measured Output, and the Output Gap
According to Bils (2004), MB in U.S. CPI inflation ends up as opposite bias in real
output growth because real growth is estimated as nominal expenditure growth minus
inflation. Eldridge (1999) explains that the Bureau of Economic Analysis (BEA) mainly
utilizes consumer-prices, producer-prices and export/import-prices to deflate nominal
output growth. Eldridge estimates the relative importance of each index with 49.7%
for consumer prices, 11.8% for producer prices and 8.5% (−9.9)% for export (import)
prices. Eldridge further points out that BEA primarily uses the CPI to deflate personal
consumption expenditure.
Analog to the BEA approach, I define measured output as nominal expenditure
17
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deflated by the measured price level, Y mt = PtYt/P
m
t,t . Here Yt denotes true real output
which bundles all products j ∈ [0, 1] according to a composite identical to equation (3).
The true GDP deflator equals the true price level because output equals consumption.
Up to first order, Yˆ mt − Yˆt = −(Pˆmt,t − Pˆt), and MB in the price level triggers the
opposite MB in measured output.
Proposition 5: Up to a first-order approximation, the bias between the true
price level and the measured price level is a one-sided, finite-order, invertible linear
filter of true inflation,
Pˆt − Pˆmt,t = b(L)pˆit , b(L) = αδ1−α(1−δ)
`−1∑
s=0
(αL)s .
Proof: See appendix B.3 and appendix B.4. As for inflation, price levels differ because
the measured price level ignores price dynamics from product turnover and overem-
phasizes prices with long durations.
From the proposition, measured output can be rewritten as
Yˆ mt = Yˆt + b(L)pˆit . (19)
I convert the mapping between output levels into a mapping between output gaps to
analyze monetary policy below. Denote the output gap xt = Yˆt − Yˆ nat as the difference
between output under sticky prices and natural output Y nat under flexible prices. It
should be recalled that if prices are flexible any product price equals the true price
level. Hence, delayed recording of new products does not trigger any price-level bias
under flexible prices, and Yˆ nat is free of MB. Subtracting Yˆ
na
t from equation (19), the
measured output gap xmt = Yˆ
m
t − Yˆ nat turns out to be a biased variant of xt,
xmt = xt + b(L)pˆit . (20)
Orphanides (2001) shows that flash estimates of macro data undergo major revisions
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due to removal of noise or arrival of news. Data revisions then trigger revisions of
output-gap nowcasts with implications for monetary policy. In contrast, the MB in xmt
does not originate from data revisions. Rather, it originates from the nonrepresentative
sample of products contained in the measured price level, and surfaces in measures
of real activity because such measures derive from nominal expenditure deflated by
measured prices. Hence, xmt remains biased even after data are revised finally.
4 Equilibrium and Parametrization
In equilibrium, the statistical agency compiles measured inflation, the representative
household maximizes lifetime utility (1) subject to the budget constraint (2) and
composite (3), firms set prices according to equation (36), product markets clear
Ct(j) = Yt(j), the labor market clears Lt =
∫ 1
0
Lt(j) dj, the bond market clears Bt = 0,
and the government conducts monetary policy specified below.
Aggregate supply relates inflation to inflation expectations and the output gap,
pˆit = βEtpˆit+1 + φxt + ut , φ =
[1−α(1−δ)β][1−α(1−δ)]
α(1−δ) ζ , ζ =
ω+σ−1
1+θωp
. (21)
See appendix A.2 for derivation. I introduce the ut shock which reflects variation in
inflation triggered by neither inflation expectations nor the output gap. Natural output
Yˆ nat is equal to the flexible-price output absent ut shocks. Parameters in ζ are defined
in appendix A.2.
The slope φ increases in δ. When the rate of firm entry and exit δ is high, inflation
reacts more sensitive to the output gap, which is proportional to marginal costs, because
more firms set prices as a function of current marginal cost. Furthermore, the slope
φ decreases in α. A higher value of α implies that firms look further into the future.
Hence, firms weigh current marginal costs less when setting their price.7
7To highlight implications of firm entry and exit for the duration of price contracts consistent with
a particular estimate of φ, totally differentiate
dφ = ∂φ∂δ dδ +
∂φ
∂αdα = 0 or
dα
dδ = −∂φ∂δ
/
∂φ
∂α =
α
1−δ ≥ 0 .
A high entry and exit rate requires a large uncensored price duration (1− α)−1 because entry and exit
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Aggregate demand relates the output gap to its expectation and the gap between
the ex-ante real interest rate and the natural real rate of interest,
xt = Etxt+1 − σ(ˆit − Etpˆit+1 − rˆnat ) . (22)
The natural real rate rˆnat = −σ−1Et(1− L−1)(Yˆ nat − gt) equals the flexible-price real
interest rate absent ut shocks. The parameter σ = − ucY¯ ucc > 0 governs the intertemporal
elasticity of substitution. The term uc is the marginal utility of consumption in steady-
state, Y¯ is steady-state output, and gt = − ucξY¯ ucc ξˆt represents a shock to the marginal
utility of consumption.
The linear model comprises the two measurement equations (17) and (20), aggregate
supply and demand (21) and (22), two exogenous processes rˆnat and ut, and initial
conditions for true inflation. I solve for model dynamics by the numerical method of
Sims (2002). I resort to a numerical solution because reasonable choices of ` create
a sizeable state vector. For all the monetary policies considered below equilibrium is
determinate and unique.
I calibrate the model to quarterly data and set the time lag ` to twelve quarters
taking into account that the U.S. CPI basket rotates once every four to five years, and
that further delays emerge in the process of obtaining the weights attached to prices.
The product entry and exit rate δ is set to 0.0625 which corresponds to 25% of product
turnover each year. The number is taken from Broda and Weinstein (2007) who report
a median entry rate (number of new products relative to all products) of 25% per year
for consumer products. As robustness check, I also report main numerical results for a
value of δ equal to 0.03125.8
provides an additional reason for price contracts to terminate. To offset the additional terminations
α must increase. Bils and Klenow (2004) find that, for a large array of consumer products, the rate of
product turnover predicts more frequent price changes. The model replicates this finding in that the
mean censored price duration (1− α(1− δ))−1 falls with product turnover δ.
8Midrigan (2007) argues that measuring the extensive margin by the entry rate overestimates its
importance because new products tend to have small market value. Broda and Weinstein (2007) report
that the value of new products relative to the value of all products is 9% such that my benchmark
value of δ seems high. However, the benchmark value seems low along another dimension. In the
model, the statistical agency samples (1 − δ)` or 46% of all products. The evidence in Broda and
Weinstein (2007) suggests that this number significantly overstates the fraction of products actually
sampled by the BLS.
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The probability α of not adjusting the price is set to 0.8 which implies an uncen-
sored mean price-duration of five quarters. Five quarters are long compared to micro
evidence in Nakamura and Steinsson (2008a), but short when compared to estimates
from medium-scale DSGE models such as Smets and Wouters (2003). Jointly, α and δ
imply a censored mean price-duration (1− α(1− δ))−1 of four quarters, close to micro
evidence.
A subjective discount rate β equal to 0.99 produces a steady-state interest rate of
about three percent per year. The intertemporal elasticity of substitution σ is set to
unity which corresponds to logarithmic utility of consumption. I set the steady-state
markup of firms to 25% having θ equal to 5. Similar to Giannoni and Woodford (2005),
ωw is set to 0.3 and ωp equals 0.5. Both numbers are consistent with a Cobb-Douglas
technology with labor coefficient of 2/3 and a labor supply elasticity with respect to
the real wage ν equal to 0.2. Slope φ then equals 0.044 in line with estimates in Linde
(2005) and Altig, Christiano, Eichenbaum, and Linde (2005) for U.S. data.
The productivity shock at = Aˆt is AR(1) with AR-coefficient equal to 0.95. Pref-
erence shock gt and inflation shock ut are AR(1) with AR-coefficient 0.475.
9 Standard
deviations of residuals of shocks are 0.672%, 0.551%, and 0.514% for the at, gt, and
ut shock, respectively. The monetary-policy shock µt introduced below is white noise
with standard deviation 0.12%. I obtain standard deviations of shock residuals from
the unconditional covariance matrix estimated for U.S. data in section 7.2.
5 Monetary Policy and Mismeasured Inflation
What are the effects of MB for monetary policy? More precisely, what happens to
welfare if a central bank applies policies, which are designed for variables measured
without bias, to variables that are measured with bias? To assess the effects of MB I
assume that the central bank does not know true inflation and the true output gap. This
9The productivity shock is more persistent than the inflation shock in line with estimates
from DSGE models and to overcome observational equivalence of the two shocks conditional on
observing iˆt, pˆit, and Yˆt. Equivalence of both shocks emerges because the model rearranges to
pˆit = βEtpˆit+1 + φYˆt + ut − 1+ωω+σ−1 at and Yˆt = EtYˆt+1 − (ˆit − Etpˆit+1) under my calibration and ig-
noring gt shocks.
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assumption amounts to assuming that the central bank does not know the mapping
from measured to true inflation. This assumption is reasonable because uncertainty
about the model and its parameters make the mapping uncertain in practice.10
I find that, across monetary-policy regimes, policies designed for true variables but
applied to measured variables imply insufficient inflation stabilization and exhibit un-
intended history dependence. Welfare effects depend on the policy regime. Welfare
deteriorates for optimal monetary policy under commitment. Welfare improves for op-
timal monetary policy under discretion, and for a central bank that commits to an
estimated interest-rate rule. Thus, MB works to the benefit of the central bank if the
central bank does not commit to fully optimal monetary policy.
To derive these results, I compare two economies which differ only with respect to
monetary policy. Whereas the central bank in Economy I applies a policy rule to true
variables, the central bank in Economy II applies the same policy rule to measured
variables. The welfare loss in Economy I is
L = E0
∞∑
t=0
βt[pˆi2t + λx
2
t ] . (23)
The parameter λ > 0 denotes the weight attached to stabilizing the true output gap.
I set λ = φ/θ which corresponds to the weight of the output gap in the utility-based
loss function.11 For my calibration λ equals 0.0088. The welfare loss in Economy II is
L = E0
∞∑
t=0
βt[pˆi2t + λx
2
t ] . (24)
I define underlined variables as variables pertaining to Economy II. To assess the effects
of MB, it is useful to evaluate the loss in Economy II relative to the loss in Economy I,
LR = (L − L)/L, for different values of the entry and exit rate δ. With a zero entry
10If the central bank knows the mapping from measured to true inflation, the central bank easily
maps measured inflation and the measured output gap into true inflation and the true output gap.
Inverting a(L) and applying it to measured inflation delivers true inflation, and equation (20) delivers
the true output gap. With true variables in hand MB is irrelevant for monetary policy, and the optimal
monetary-policy rules derived in Woodford (2003) or Gal´ı (2008) apply.
11With λ = φ/θ the loss L is proportional to household utility up to second order. The derivation
of the utility-based loss is analog to the derivation in Woodford (2003), chapter 6, replacing α there
by κ here and imposing homogenous labor.
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and exit rate there is no MB such that losses in Economy I and II coincide and LR = 0.
Raising δ above zero triggers MB in inflation and the output gap. Accordingly, mone-
tary policies, and hence losses, in both economies diverge. I now assess the relative loss
for three different monetary-policy regimes.
5.1 Optimal Commitment
When the central bank in Economy I can commit to future action, the policy rule
pˆit +
λ
φ
(xt − xt−1) = 0 (25)
minimizes the loss L in Economy I over {xt, pˆit} subject to equation (21). The central
bank in Economy II applies the same policy rule to variables that are measured with
bias,
pˆimt +
λ
φ
(xmt − xmt−1) = 0 . (26)
The left panel of figure 2 plots the relative loss LR for increasing degree of MB and
three different values of the time lag `. For each value of `, the relative loss increases
in MB which indicates that welfare in Economy II is lower than welfare in Economy I.
[Figure 2 about here.]
MB affects the optimal policy rule along two dimensions, and both dimensions
deteriorate welfare. To see this, rewrite the policy rule in Economy II in terms of true
variables by substituting measurement equations (17) and (20),
pˆit +
Λ
φ
(xt − xt−1)− Λφ b0pˆit−1 = 0 if ` = 1 ,
pˆit +
Λ
φ
(xt − xt−1) +
∑`
i=1
q˜ipˆit−i = 0 if ` ≥ 2 .
(27)
I define the effective weight on stabilizing the output gap, Λ = λ [a0 +
λ
φ
b0]
−1, as in-
tended weight λ times the inverse of the factor [a0 +
λ
φ
b0]. Parameters a0 and b0 denote
the coefficients in a(L) and b(L) attached to L0, respectively. The factor is less than
23
Monetary Policy and Mismeasured Inflation
one if MB is present such that, in general, the effective weight Λ exceeds the intended
weight λ. Moreover, I define q˜i = [ai +
λ
φ
(bi − bi−1)]/[a0 + λφb0]. Parameters ai and bi
denote the coefficients in a(L) and b(L) attached to Li, respectively, with a` = b` = 0.
The first effect of MB on policy is most apparent for a time lag ` equal to one
quarter. In this case, measurement equations (17) and (20) reduce to pˆimt = (1− b0)pˆit
and xmt = xt + b0pˆit having a0 + b0 = 1. The statistical agency wrongly attributes a
fraction b0 > 0 of true inflation to x
m
t rather than attributing it to pi
m
t . Accordingly, the
central bank attaches the coefficient λ/φ < 1 rather than unity to b0pˆit when it targets
measured instead of true variables. Thus, true inflation is stabilized insufficiently in the
policy rule (27) because the effective weight Λ on stabilizing the output gap exceeds
the intended weight λ.12
The second effect of MB is that targeting measured instead of true variables intro-
duces additional states into the policy rule (27), namely the term Λ
φ
b0pˆit−1 when ` is
equal to one quarter or the entire lag polynomial
∑`
i=1 q˜ipˆit−i when ` exceeds one quar-
ter. The additional history dependence interferes with the optimal history dependence
(xt−1). The optimal history dependence ensures that increases in the price level are
offset by lower inflation rates later on. Forward-looking firms anticipate the price-level
reduction and increase their prices less, so that inflation increases less to start with.
Therefore, the output gap falls less initially, and the tradeoff between stabilizing infla-
tion or the output gap improves. The past true inflation rates that enter the policy rule
via MB disturb the working of optimal history dependence, and deteriorate welfare.
5.2 Optimal Discretion
When the central bank in Economy I cannot commit to future action, the policy rule
pˆit +
λ
φ
xt = 0 (28)
12If λ/φ > 1 true inflation is stabilized too much. MB does not distort stabilization outcomes if
λ = φ. Notably, policy rules which respond to nominal output growth overcome the MB considered
here because MB wrongly subdivides nominal output growth into real output growth and inflation
but leaves nominal output growth unaffected. Rudebusch (2002) assesses nominal output rules for
monetary policy.
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minimizes L over {xt, pˆit} subject to equation (21) and conditional on private-sector
expectations. The central bank in Economy II applies the same policy rule to variables
that are measured with bias,
pˆimt +
λ
φ
xmt = 0 . (29)
In the middle panel of figure 2, the relative loss LR increases in MB when the time lag
of the statistical agency amounts to one quarter, as under commitment. Different from
commitment, however, the relative loss falls when the time lag is equal to four quarters
or one year. To understand this, again rewrite the policy rule in Economy II in terms
of true variables using equations (17) and (20),
pˆit +
Λ
φ
xt = 0 if ` = 1 ,
pˆit +
Λ
φ
xt +
`−1∑
i=1
qipˆit−i = 0 if ` ≥ 2 .
(30)
The effective weight Λ is as defined before, and qi = [ai +
λ
φ
bi]/[a0 +
λ
φ
b0]. As before,
a central bank that targets measured rather than true variables distorts the weight
attached to stabilizing the output gap, and introduces a reference to past true inflation
rates into the policy rule. The history dependence, which is absent in Economy I, occurs
despite the fact that the central bank operates with discretion.13
When ` is equal to one quarter, the effective weight Λ implies insufficient inflation
stabilization which triggers the welfare loss in Economy II relative to Economy I in
figure 2. When ` exceeds one quarter, insufficient inflation stabilization still triggers
welfare losses in Economy II. However, the history dependence in form of past true
inflation rates affects inflation expectations and improves the tradeoff between stabiliz-
ing inflation or the output gap in Economy II. As evident from figure 2, the benefit of
history dependence overcompensates the loss from insufficient inflation stabilization.14
13History dependence in equation (30) is displayed in terms of inflation. However, it is straightfor-
ward to display history dependence as pit +
λ
φg(L)xt = 0 having g(L) = [a(L) +
λ
φb(L)]
−1.
14In Nimark (2005), a discretionary central bank gets the tradeoff between stabilizing inflation or
the output gap wrong when it has imperfect information. Pearlman (1992) shows that welfare may
improve when a discretionary central bank has imperfect information because imperfect information
reduces the costs from time inconsistency. Both papers stick to the assumptions that variables are
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5.3 Interest-Rate Rule
The last policy regime I consider is the case when the central bank in Economy II
pursues an estimated interest-rate rule with interest-rate smoothing,
iˆt = 0.92ˆit−1 + (1− 0.92)(1.5pˆimt + 0.625Yˆ
m
t ) + µt . (31)
The policy rule is of the same functional form as the one estimated in Orphanides
(2001). Coefficients are OLS estimates (rounded) for quarterly U.S. data from 1984:1
to 2008:1, and µt is a zero-mean white-noise residual. For estimation, I equate pˆi
m
t to
U.S. CPI inflation and Yˆ
m
t to U.S. real personal consumption expenditure (section 7.1
describes the data). Interest-rate smoothing is estimated to be high presumably because
interest rates exhibit a pronounced downward trend in the sample. The central bank
in Economy I pursues the same rule formulated in terms of true variables,
iˆt = 0.92ˆit−1 + (1− 0.92)(1.5pˆit + 0.625Yˆt) + µt . (32)
The right panel of figure 2 shows the relative loss that emerges when monetary
policy pursues the estimated interest-rate rule. Qualitatively, the relative loss falls for
realistic values of the time lag ` similar to the case of optimal discretion. Quantita-
tively, the relative loss is large in absolute terms when monetary policy commits to
the estimated interest-rate rule.15 Again, I illustrate the finding by rewriting the policy
rule in Economy II in terms of true variables,
iˆt = 0.92ˆit−1 + (1− 0.92)([1.5a0 + 0.625b0]pˆit + 0.625Yˆ t) + µt if ` = 1 ,
iˆt = 0.92ˆit−1 + (1− 0.92)([1.5a(L) + 0.625b(L)]pˆit + 0.625Yˆ t) + µt if ` ≥ 2 .
(33)
First, when ` is equal to one quarter the coefficient on true inflation is smaller in Econ-
perturbed by white-noise exogenous error, and that the central bank engages into optimal filtering of
exogenous error. In contrast, I assume that variables are contaminated by endogenous MB, and that
the central bank disregards endogenous MB.
15To compute the relative loss, which now requires me to solve equations (21), (22) and the policy
rule jointly, I set the variance-covariance matrix of shock residuals to the unconditional variance-
covariance matrix of shock residuals that I estimate in section 7.2. Imposing a diagonal variance-
covariance matrix of shock residuals amplifies LR.
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omy II than in Economy I because 1.5a0 + 0.625b0 < 1.5. Second, when ` exceeds unity
lags of true inflation enter the policy rule because measured inflation and measured
output depend on lags of true inflation.
To see how both differences map into welfare, figure 3 plots impulse responses to a
positive productivity shock for ` equal to three years. Below, I find that productivity
shocks are the main driver of the difference between variables in Economy II and I.
The top row of the figure shows variables in Economy II whereas the bottom row shows
variables in Economy I. Evidently, inflation and the output gap in Economy II react
less to the shock. Thus, a monetary policy that weighs current true inflation less, but
features lags of true inflation, delivers higher welfare.
Consider the dynamics in figure 3 in more detail. When productivity grows fast,
optimizing firms set low prices and true inflation declines. By the lags of true inflation in
the policy rule, the interest rate in Economy II is expected to remain below steady-state
over a longer period of time than the interest rate in Economy I. By aggregate demand,
the low expected interest rate drags output in Economy II above output in Economy I.
By aggregate supply, higher output offsets some downward pressure on inflation such
that true inflation in Economy II declines less than in Economy I. By the policy rule,
the interest rate decline less in Economy II because of both inflation declining less and
output increasing more. High sticky-price output also narrows the output gap. In sum,
the lags of true inflation in the policy rule lead to greater stabilization of inflation and
the output gap, and to higher welfare.16
In figure 3, the effects of the lags of true inflation overlay the effects of the smaller
effective coefficient on current true inflation in the policy rule. The case ` = 1 (not
shown) isolates the effects of the smaller coefficient on true inflation in Economy II.
In this case, monetary policy in Economy II boosts output less in response to low
inflation such that true inflation is stabilized less. Moreover, the output gap widens
16In order to assess whether welfare effects are large or small I compute the permanent reductions
in consumption, which are equivalent to the loss in Economy I and to the loss in Economy II, and
compare both. The household would sacrifice 0.0053 percent of steady-state consumption in Economy
I to prevent inefficient variation of inflation and the output gap. The corresponding numbers in
Economy II are 0.0030 percent. Thus, the benefit of a central bank that targets measured rather than
true variables amounts to 0.0023 percent of steady-state consumption.
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because output in Economy II remains below output in Economy I. Thus, a smaller
effective coefficient on true inflation, when considered in isolation, leads to inflation
and the output gap being stabilized less, and to lower welfare.
[Figure 3 about here.]
6 Measurement Bias versus Measurement Error
The literature recognizes that mismeasurement in inflation and output can be im-
portant for the conduct of monetary policy. For simplicity, the literature models the
difference between true and measured variables as white-noise exogenous process.17 I
showed that, if we take seriously the notion that mismeasurement is due to mistakes
made by the statistical agency, then the difference between true and measured vari-
ables is not a white-noise exogenous process. I refer to a white-noise exogenous process,
which perturbs true variables, as measurement error (ME).
In this section, I show that assuming ME instead of MB matters for how disregarded
mismeasurement affects monetary policy. That is, if a discretionary central bank ap-
plies its policy rule, which is designed for correctly-measured variables, to variables
that are measured with white-noise exogenous error (as opposed to endogenous MB)
then inflation is not stabilized insufficiently nor does the effective policy rule feature
additional states. Furthermore, welfare always deteriorates in case of ME.
As before, I analyze the effects of ME by comparing two economies. The central bank
in Economy I implements optimal discretionary policy pˆit +
λ
φ
xt = 0 which minimizes
the loss (23). The central bank in Economy II applies the same policy rule to measured
inflation and the measured output gap, pˆiξt +
λ
φ
xξt = 0. Measured variables equal true
variables plus error,
pˆiξt = p˜it + ξpit , ξpit ∼ (0, σ2pi) ,
xξt = x˜t + ξxt , ξxt ∼ (0, σ2x) .
(34)
17Among others, Pearlman (1992), Aoki (2003), Svensson and Woodford (2003), Nimark (2005),
Aoki (2006) study optimal monetary policy when monetary-policy indicators are perturbed by white-
noise exogenous error.
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Here, p˜it and x˜t denote true variables in Economy II, and ξpit and ξxt are white-noise
exogenous processes which are mutually independent and independent of ut. The pa-
rameters which govern the degree of ME are σ2pi, σ
2
x ≥ 0 such that the policy rule in
Economy I obtains as special case σ2pi = σ
2
x = 0 of the one in Economy II.
Substituting equations (34) into the policy rule in Economy II delivers
p˜it +
λ
φ
x˜t = −(ξpit + λφξxt) . (35)
First, ME does not imply insufficient inflation stabilization. Rather, ME is converted
into an unsystematic policy control-error. Second, no additional states enter the policy
rule when the central bank targets variables measured with ME.
Analog to MB I evaluate the loss in the case of ME by Lξ = E0
∑∞
t=0 β
t[p˜i2t + λx˜
2
t ].
The equilibrium loss as a function of σ2u, σ
2
pi, and σ
2
x rearranges to
18
Lξ = λ+φ2
λ
(
f2piσ
2
u
1−ρ2u
)
+ 1
λ+φ2
[φ2σ2pi + λ
2σ2x] .
Parameters ρu and σu denote the AR-coefficient of the ut shock and the standard
deviation of the shock residual, respectively. The first term on the right-hand side
corresponds to the loss in Economy I having σ2pi = σ
2
x = 0. The second right-hand term
indicates the additional loss from ME in Economy II. The loss in Economy II increases
in ME, and thus cannot undercut the loss in Economy I contrary to what happens for
MB.
7 Applications
I quantify the effects of MB in historical U.S. data along three dimensions. I start
with the correlation of inflation and output because business-cycle models are often
evaluated by comparing the correlation of inflation and output in the model one-to-one
18The system (35) and (21) can be easily solved by the method of undeterminate coefficients. The
equilibrium paths of inflation and the output gap are p˜it = fpiut + γpiξpit + γxξxt and x˜t = −φfpiλ ut +
γpi
φ ξpit+
γx
φ ξxt with coefficients fpi = λ/(λ(1− βρu) + φ2), γpi = −φ2/(λ+ φ2) and γx = −λφ/(λ+ φ2).
In the limit β → 1 the loss becomes Lξ = var(p˜it) + λvar(x˜t), and equilibrium inflation and output
gap serve to express the loss in terms of the variances of shock residuals.
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to the correlation of inflation and output in the data (e.g. Smets and Wouters (2007)).
I map inflation and output in the model to inflation and output in the data, and show
that the correlation of inflation and output in the model is lower than the correlation
of inflation and output in the data because of MB. Thus, comparing the correlation of
inflation and output in the model to its correspondent in the data is appropriate only
after accounting for endogenous MB.
7.1 Correlation of Inflation and Output
To compute correlations I equate measured inflation pˆimt with data on U.S. CPI inflation,
and measured output Yˆ mt with data on U.S. real personal consumption expenditure
(PCE).19 Then, I transform measured output and measured inflation into true output
and true inflation, respectively, using equations (17) and (19). True inflation equals
the inverse of a(L) applied to measured inflation. True output equals measured output
minus the MB in price levels b(L)pˆit. Neither transformation relies on assumptions
about monetary policy.20
The top-left panel of figure 4 shows business-cycle correlations of true output and
lags and leads of true inflation for the sample 1960:1 – 2008:1 (circled lines). The same
panel contains correlations of measured output and measured inflation (crossed lines)
jointly with a 95% confidence band (dashed lines).
[Figure 4 about here.]
A main finding is that the correlation of true inflation and true output is lower than the
correlation of measured inflation and measured output at all leads and lags. Converting
19I prefer PCE data to GDP data because, strictly speaking, the model of MB applies to private
consumption rather than to government consumption or investment. Below, I confirm that the same
conclusions emerge when I equate measured output in the model with GDP data.
20PCE is the Quantity Index Real Personal Consumption Expenditures. GDP is in billions of
chained 2000 dollars. Both series are quarterly, seasonally adjusted, and obtained from BEA. I compute
population as product of Employment Level (16 years and over, LNS12000000Q) times the inverse
Employment-Population Ratio (LNS12300000Q). Both series are quarterly, seasonally adjusted, and
obtained from BLS. I use population to compute PCE (GDP) per person and denote with Yˆ mt (Yˆ
m
GDPt)
the percentage deviation of log level PCE (GDP) from HP trend. Monthly data on the Fed Funds
rate (FEDFUNDS, averages of daily figures) is from the Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve
System. Monthly data on the CPI (U.S. city average, all items, CUSR0000SA0, seasonally adjusted)
is from BLS. For monthly data, I use the first observation per quarter. Pre-sample values required to
apply filters a(L)−1 and b(L) are set to zero.
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measured output into true output amounts to subtracting b(L)pˆit. The transformation
injects negative correlation of output and inflation.
As a first robustness check, the top-right panel of figure 4 shows correlations of
inflation and output when I equate measured output in the model to GDP data instead
of PCE data. I denote measured output by Yˆ mGDPt in this case. Again, the correlation of
true inflation and true output remains below the correlation of measured inflation and
measured output. As second robustness check, I cut the calibrated value of δ half to
0.03125. In this case (not shown), the shift in the correlations of inflation and output
for data from 1960:1–2008:1 is less pronounced but remains statistically significant.
As final robustness check, I split the sample into the “Great Inflation” and the
“Great Moderation” period, and compare correlations of inflation and output for each
subsample. The two bottom panels of figure 4 show that transforming measured vari-
ables into true variables affects the correlation of inflation and output less during the
Great Moderation (right) than during the Great Inflation (left). The reason is that the
relative standard deviation std(pˆimt )/std(Yˆ
m
t ) is about 0.5 during the Great Inflation but
falls to 0.35 during the Great Moderation. Accordingly, spillover effects (represented
by b(L)pˆit) of inflation mismeasurement into output are large during the Great Infla-
tion but small during the Great Moderation. More generally, the model predicts that
spillover effects of inflation mismeasurement into output matter most when inflation is
volatile relative to output.
7.2 Measurement Bias and U.S. Productivity Growth
Trehan (1999) argues that historical U.S. interest rates exceeded optimal levels during
the period of strong productivity growth in the 1990s because policy makers missed a
shift in the average growth rate of productivity and output at that time. Accordingly,
policy makers interpreted most growth in productivity and output as cyclical expansion
and tightened monetary policy more than done otherwise to prevent the economy from
overheating.
[Figure 5 about here.]
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I quantify a related but slightly different possibility of policy mistake, namely, that
U.S. monetary policy in the 1990s reacted to measured output and measured inflation.
I evaluate this possibility by a counterfactual in which monetary policy reacts to true
output and true inflation. Specifically, I describe historical U.S. monetary policy by
the interest-rate rule (31). I solve the model under that policy rule and use the model
solution to partition historical data into historical shocks by means of the Kalman
filter. Then, I solve the model under the counterfactual interest-rate rule (32), and
retrieve counterfactual data using the new model solution but historical shocks.21
The main finding from the top-left panel of figure 5 is that counterfactual interest
rates remain below historical interest rates except before 1992 and for a short episode
around 2000. Between 1992:2 and 1999:2 counterfactual interest rates are lower by 70
basis points on average. The interest-rate differential is large enough that counterfactual
rates hit the zero-lower bound several quarters in a row between 2003 and 2005. Overall,
there would have been lower interest rates in the 1990s had the Fed accounted for
endogenous MB.
The interest-rate differential comoves inversely but tightly with productivity shocks
at shown in the bottom-right panel of figure 5. The tight comovement suggests that MB
matters most in the wake of productivity shocks. Indeed, when partitioning the interest-
rate differential between 1992:2 and 1999:2 into contribution per shock, productivity
shocks imply a mean difference of 72.5 basis points compared to −3.33, −0.63, and 1.20
basis points for ut, gt, and µt shocks, respectively. Productivity shocks also dominate
the inflation and output differentials shown in the figure.
Partly, the prevalence of productivity shocks derives from their large sample stan-
dard deviation of 3.9% compared to 0.77%, 0.89%, and 0.12% for ut, gt, and µt shocks,
respectively. It matters further that inflation reacts less than output to gt and µt shocks.
Therefore, spillover of inflation mismeasurement into output is small, and MB affects
21I run the Kalman filter on data from 1960:1 to 2008:1, applying the policy rule estimated for the
subsample 1984:1 to 2008:1, to mitigate the influence of initial values. To obtain historical shocks initial
values of unobserved states are set to zero. To obtain counterfactual data initial values of unobserved
states are set to unobserved states estimated for historical policy. The initial forecast-error covariance
matrix is set to the unconditional covariance matrix implied by the model’s recursive law of motion
in both runs. Statistic are computed for the subsample 1984:1 to 2008:1 unless noted otherwise.
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interest rates little. In contrast, inflation reacts more than output to ut and at shocks
such that spillover of inflation mismeasurement into output is large. Accordingly, the
effect of MB on interest rates is large for these shocks. Finally, ut shocks die out faster
than at shocks and thus matter less. Therefore, in response to ut shocks, firms and
households adjust prices and quantities less, and inflation and output respond less.
Recall from section 5.3 that, after a productivity shock, historical interest rates iˆt
decline less than counterfactual rates iˆt because MB introduces lags of true inflation
into the historical policy rule. The additional history dependence implies that measured
inflation declines less whereas measured output increases more. By the policy rule,
historical interest rates then decline less. Furthermore, recall from section 5.3 that
welfare is higher for the historical policy than for the counterfactual policy. This ranking
remains true in the sample at hand with a ratio of standard deviations std(pˆi)/std(pˆi)
equal to 0.61, and the corresponding ratios for the output gap and the interest rate
equal to 0.98 and 0.70, respectively.
The top-right panel of figure 5 shows two consequences of MB for inflation. First,
historical measured inflation overstates counterfactual true inflation when productivity
grows fast. That is, the correlation of productivity and historical measured inflation
is less negative (−0.30) than the correlation of productivity and counterfactual true
inflation (−0.59). Second, MB can hide true deflation if measured inflation is low
and productivity grows fast. True deflation may arise because the inflation differential
pˆimt − pˆit is very volatile with standard deviation 1.10%, evolves fairly persistent with
autocorrelation 0.97, and correlates strongly negative with historical measured infla-
tion (−0.66). Both consequences of MB reinforce believes of policy makers that MB
is a matter of particular concern when rapid changes in productivity escort low mea-
sured inflation. Issing (2001), p.2, stresses that “The present scenario of rapid changing
technology combined with low inflation makes the issue of measurement biases in price
indices of the utmost relevance for monetary policy.”
The bottom-left panel of figure 5 shows that historically measured output is less
volatile than counterfactual output with std(Yˆ
m
)/std(Yˆ ) equal to 0.79. Moreover, mea-
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sured output growth (not shown) correlates positively (0.08) with the MB in inflation
pˆimt − pˆit. Accordingly, the model is consistent with the pro-cyclical MB documented
by Broda and Weinstein (2007) though pro-cyclicality is weak. It is reassuring that
measured output growth also correlates positively (0.14) with the inflation differen-
tial pˆimt − pˆit. Both correlations increase marginally when measured output growth is
computed from data that is not HP-filtered.
As robustness check, I reduce the value of δ to 0.03125. The average interest-rate
differential between 1992:2 and 1999:2 falls from 70 to 35 basis point but counterfactual
interest rates continue to hit the zero lower bound between 2003 and 2005. The stan-
dard deviation of the inflation differential pˆimt − pˆit falls from 1.10% to 0.54% whereas
both its autocorrelation and its correlation with historical measured inflation remain
essentially unchanged. The ratio std(Yˆ
m
)/std(Yˆ ) increases from 0.79 to 0.89, and the
correlation of measured output growth and MB in inflation pˆimt − pˆit increases slightly.
Overall, correlations remain mostly unchanged despite the fact that differentials be-
tween historical measured and counterfactual true variables turn less variable when δ
is low.
7.3 Does Policy Amplify Effects of Measurement Bias?
MB affects the economy via two channels. The first channel is that inflation and output
are wrongly measured. The second channel is that the central bank loops MB back
into the economy by responding to wrongly-measured variables. Here, I return to the
counterfactual exercise of the previous section to estimate how much of the difference
between historical measured variables and counterfactual true variables derives from a
central bank which loops MB back into the economy.
Let z equal Yˆt or pˆit and denote historical measured variables as z
m and coun-
terfactual true variables as z like before. Then, partition the difference zm − z as
zm − z = (zm − zm) + (zm − z). The first right-hand term isolates the “loop-back” ef-
fect of MB. It is the difference between historical and counterfactual measured variables
that emerges when the central bank either responds to measured variables (looping MB
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back) or responds to true variables (not looping MB back). The second term reflects
“pure MB”, namely the difference between counterfactual measured and counterfactual
true variables when monetary policy responds to true variables. The variance of the dif-
ferential equals var(zm − z) = var(zm − zm) + var(zm − z) + 2cov(zm − zm, zm − z).
Table 1 collects respective sample moments.
[Table 1 about here.]
Consider output first. The table shows that the “loop-back” effect of MB and “pure
MB” contribute about the same share to the variation in Yˆ
m
t − Yˆt. Individual terms
vary more than their sum because their covariance is negative and implies a large
correlation of −0.63. For inflation, the “loop-back” effect accounts for the major bulk
of variation in pˆimt − pˆit, whereas “pure MB” contributes little. The covariance between
the “loop-back” effect and “pure MB” is positive and implies a moderate correlation
of 0.26.
When reducing the value of δ to 0.03125, the most significant change in table 1 is
that the variance of zm − z relative to the variance of zm in the last column falls by a
factor of three to four. However, the relative importance of each term in the partition
of var(zm − z) remains almost identical. It thus seems a robust feature of the model
that the “loop-back” effect of MB is fairly important compared to “pure MB”.
However, I somewhat discount the importance of the “loop-back” effect because,
by assumption, the model attributes too much variation to the “loop-back” effect and
too little to “pure MB”. First, central banks monitor many indicators of inflation and
output. To the extent that endogenous biases in these indicators are not perfectly
correlated, central banks may sidestep at least some endogenous bias by responding
to averages of measured indicators. Second, the model precludes by assumption that
new products differ from established products with respect to quality, demand, or
production efficiency. Such factors are likely to amplify price differentials between new
and established products, and hence would amplify “pure MB”.
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8 Conclusion
Econometric analysis of U.S. product-level data points to MB in CPI inflation be-
cause the statistical agency measures product entry with a delay. Estimated MB varies
over time, is serially correlated, and pro-cyclical. However, the scarcity of product-level
data imposes limits to estimating MB econometrically. Greenwood and Uysal (2005) ar-
gue that, complementary to econometric analysis, economic models constitute a useful
laboratory for comparing different price indices. Along these lines, I analyze a New-
Keynesian model that features product entry and exit and a statistical agency which
measures product entry with a delay.
The model predicts that MB in inflation is serially correlated and pro-cyclical,
as in the data. Specifically, measured inflation is more persistent than true, utility-
based inflation because measured inflation lacks the short price spells of new products;
measured inflation is less volatile than true inflation because it lacks the price changes
which result from product turnover. Furthermore, because MB in inflation transmits
into output, the correlation of true inflation and true output is significantly lower than
the correlation of measured inflation and measured output.
I apply the model to study monetary-policy effects of MB. MB implies that the
central bank stabilizes inflation insufficiently, and that the policy rule becomes more
history dependent. Whereas insufficient inflation stabilization leads to lower welfare
across monetary-policy regimes, more history dependence leads to higher welfare for
discretionary monetary policy. Quantitatively, the benefit from history dependence
overcompensates the loss from insufficient inflation stabilization.
I conclude that certain properties of aggregate data on inflation and output at
business-cycle frequency reflect measurement rather than the behavior of economic
agents. Validating business-cycle models and assessing their implications for monetary
policy without taking into account this fact is likely to deliver biased conclusions.
Broadly speaking, endogenous MB constitutes a nontrivial link between theory and
data, and matters for analysts and policymakers alike.
Future research could extend my analysis along several dimensions. First, the as-
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sumption of perfect information on the part of firms and households could be modified.
The modification is likely to affect the dynamics of individual product prices and, hence,
the dynamics of true inflation but should not alter the conclusion that measured infla-
tion is less volatile but more persistent than true inflation. Second, one could consider
how accounting for MB alters the fit of the New-Keynesian model to data and the
estimates of deep parameters. Third, it is interesting to explore how monetary policy
optimally takes into account the mapping from measured to true inflation when this
mapping is uncertain. Finally, endogenous MB and exogenous ME are likely to coexist
in practice, and future research should study optimal monetary policy when the central
bank cannot tell apart bias from error.
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A Equilibrium Conditions
A.1 Household Optimality Conditions
Optimal household choices require
1 = βEt
[
uc(Ct+1, ξt+1)
uc(Ct, ξt)
(1 + it)Pt
Pt+1
]
,
Wt
Pt
=
hL(Lt)
uc(Ct, ξt)
, PtCt = WtLt +Dt ,
where transversality conditions hold and bond market clearing has been used to simplify
the budget constraint (Woodford (2003), chapter 3, provides a detailed derivation). No-
tation uc(Ct, ξt) abbreviates ∂u(Ct, ξt)/∂Ct. Notation hL(Lt) abbreviates ∂h(Lt)/∂Lt.
A.2 Aggregate Supply Relationship
The optimal pricing condition to problem (5) is
0 =Et
∞∑
i=0
(κβ)iΩt+i,tYt+i(j) [(1− θ) + θSt+i(j)/P ?t (j)] (36)
with real marginal costs St(j)
Pt
= hL(Lt)
uc(Yt,ξt)
1
Atf ′(f−1(Yt(j)/At)) . I linearize the optimal pricing
condition and marginal costs and combine both equations with the linearized recursive
law of motion of the true price level. I obtain
pˆit =
(1−κβ)(1−κ)
κ
(1 + θωp)
−1sˆt + βEtpˆit+1 (37)
denoting with sˆt average real marginal costs. Parameters are defined analog to Wood-
ford (2003) as ν = hLLL¯
hL
, χ = f
L¯f ′ , ωp = − Y¯ f
′′
(f ′)2 , ωw = νχ and ω = ωp + ωw. Natural
output equals Yˆ nat =
1+ω
ω+σ−1at +
σ−1
ω+σ−1 gt with Aˆt = at. Real average marginal costs
sˆt = (ω + σ
−1)xt are proportional to the output gap xt = Yˆt − Yˆ nat such that equation
(37) reformulates to equation (21) in the main text.
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B Measurement Bias
B.1 Substitution Bias
To show Bˆsubt = pˆimt − pˆint = 0, linearize equation (7) as pˆimt =
∫
N (t,`)w
m
j pˆit(j) dj exploit-
ing steady-state relationships pim = pi = pij = 1, and the fact that linearized measured
weights integrate to zero by equation (8), 0 =
∫
N (t,`) w
m
j wˆ
m
t−1,t(j) dj . Here w
m
j denotes
the measured steady-state weight identical for all products j in a symmetric steady-
state. Equivalently, linearize equation (10) as pˆint =
∫
N (t,`)w
n
j pˆit(j) dj accounting for the
fact that weights (11) integrate to zero once linearized. Because wmj = w
n
j = 1/(1− δ)`
in symmetric steady-state measured and conservative inflation are identical up to first
order, pˆimt = pˆi
n
t , and the result follows.
B.2 New-Product Bias
The proof applies the same strategy of the proof to proposition 2 to express measured
price levels as functions of current and past optimal product prices.
The (1− δ)` products in N (t, `) are composed out of infinitely many entry cohorts
s, each of size δ in the entry period, (1 − δ)` = ∑−∞s=t−`(1 − δ)t−sδ . Thus, P nt,t is a
weighted sum of average prices in each cohort s ≤ t,
(P nt,t)
1−θ =
∫
N (t,`)
P 1−θt (j) dj =
−∞∑
s=t−`
(1− δ)t−sδ Λt(s) .
The sum puts zero weight to the ` most recent cohorts. Equation (15) in the main
text defines Λt(s). For comparison, (P
n
t−1,t)
1−θ =
∑−∞
s=t−`(1−δ)t−sδ Λt−1(s) . Rearrange
(P nt,t)
1−θ as
(P nt,t)
1−θ
(1− δ)` = (1− α)
`−1∑
k=0
αk(P ?t−k)
1−θ + α` P 1−θt−`
employing the recursive representation of the true price level. The sum vanishes if ` = 1.
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Analog transformation of (P nt−1,t)
1−θ delivers
(P nt−1,t)
1−θ
(1− δ)` = (1− α)
`−1∑
k=1
αk−1(P ?t−k)
1−θ + α`−1 P 1−θt−` .
The sum vanishes if ` = 1. Linearizing (P nt,t)
1−θ and (P nt−1,t)
1−θ and exploiting P¯ = P¯ ?,
P¯ n/P¯ ? = (1− δ)`/(1−θ) and (1− α)∑`−1k=0 αk + α` = 1 delivers
Pˆ nt,t = (1− α)
`−1∑
k=0
αkPˆ ?t−k + α
` Pˆt−` , Pˆ nt−1,t = (1− α)
`−1∑
k=1
αk−1Pˆ ?t−k + α
`−1 Pˆt−` .(38)
Thus, pint linearizes as
pˆint = Pˆ
n
t,t − Pˆ nt−1,t = (1− α)
[
Pˆ ?t − (1− α)
`−1∑
k=1
αk−1Pˆ ?t−k − α`−1 Pˆt−`
]
. (39)
Linearizing Bnewt then produces
Bˆnewt = (1− α)
[
Pˆ ?t − (1− α)
`−1∑
k=1
αk−1Pˆ ?t−k − α`−1 Pˆt−`
]− pˆit .
The recursive law of motion of the true price level implies Pˆ ?t−k = Pˆt−k +
κ
1−κ pˆit−k. Com-
bine with Bˆnewt to obtain
Bˆnewt =
(
1−α
1−α(1−δ) − 1
)
pˆit +
(1−α)δ
1−α(1−δ)
`−1∑
s=1
αspˆit−s ,
which corresponds to Bˆnewt in proposition 3.
B.3 Bias in the Price Level
Obtain Pˆ ?t−s =
κ
1−κ pˆit−s + Pˆt−s from the recursive law of motion of Pt. Equations (6) and
(9) deliver Pˆmt,t = Pˆ
n
t,t and Pˆ
m
t−1,t = Pˆ
n
t−1,t once linearized. Combine with (38) to obtain
Pˆmt,t = (1− α)
`−1∑
s=0
αsPˆ ?t−s + α
` Pˆt−` =
(1−α)κ
1−κ
`−1∑
s=0
αspˆit−s + (1− α)
`−1∑
s=0
αsPˆt−s + α` Pˆt−`
= (1−α)κ
1−κ
`−1∑
s=0
αspˆit−s + Pˆt − α
`−1∑
s=0
αspˆit−s = Pˆt − αδ1−α(1−δ)
`−1∑
s=0
αspˆit−s .
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Thus Pˆt − Pˆmt,t = b(L)pˆit.
B.4 Properties of a(L) and b(L)
For ` = 1, 0 < a(1) ≤ 1 follows immediately from proposition 3 if α, δ ∈ [0, 1). For
` = 2, 3, . . . I show that (i) a(1) = 1 if α = 0, δ = 0 or both, and (ii) 0 < a(1) < 1
if α, δ ∈ (0, 1). Invertibility of a(L) requires that coefficients of a(L) are absolutely
summable. From proposition 3 it follows immediately that all coefficients of a(L) are
non-negative if α, δ ∈ [0, 1) and ` = 1, 2, . . . Therefore, it suffices to show that coeffi-
cients are summable, a(1) <∞, which follows from step (i) and (ii).
(i) Rewrite a(L) in proposition 3 as a(L) = 1−α
1−α(1−δ)
(
(1− δ)L0 + δ 1−(αL)`
1−αL
)
or
a(1) = 1−α
1−α(1−δ)
(
(1− δ) + δ 1−α`
1−α
)
= 1− δα`
1−α(1−δ) . (40)
Insert α = 0, δ = 0 or both to find a(1) = 1.
(ii) Equation (40) implies a(1) < 1 if − δα`
1−α(1−δ) < 0 which is true for all α, δ ∈ (0, 1).
Also, (40) implies 0 < a(1) if δα
`
1−α(1−δ) < 1. Equivalently, αδ(1− α`−1) > −(1− α)
which is true for all α, δ ∈ (0, 1).
Similarly, all coefficients of b(L), bs =
αs+1δ
1−α(1−δ) , s = 0, . . . , `− 1 are nonnegative.
Rewrite b(L) = δ
1−α(1−δ)
(
1−(αL)`+1
1−αL − L0
)
from which one finds b(1) <∞. Thus, b(L)
is invertible.
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Figure 1: The top panel shows relative frequencies of terminated price spells with durations s for
measured and true inflation. The bottom panel shows the spectrum of measured inflation divided by
the spectrum of true inflation. Section 4 describes the calibration.
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Figure 2: Welfare loss in Economy II relative to the welfare loss in Economy I, 100 LR, for optimal
monetary policy under commitment (left), for optimal monetary policy under discretion (middle), and
for monetary policy which commits to a simple interest-rate rule (right).
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Figure 3: Impulse responses of true variables (circled lines) and measured variables (solid lines)
to a positive productivity shock of one percent. Top row shows the nominal interest rate, inflation,
output, and the true output gap (dashed line) in Economy II. Bottom row shows the same variables in
Economy I. Interest rates and inflation rates are annual rates. Output and output gap are percentage
deviations from trend.
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Figure 4: The top-left panel shows correlation of Yˆt, pˆit+s (circled line) and Yˆ mt , pˆi
m
t+s (crossed line)
for 1960:1–2008:1. Dashed lines correspond to a 95% confidence band. The top-right panel shows cor-
relation of YˆGDPt, pˆit+s and Yˆ mGDPt, pˆi
m
t+s for the same period. The bottom-left panel shows correlation
of Yˆt, pˆit+s and Yˆ mt , pˆi
m
t+s for the Great Inflation period 1960:1–1979:2. The bottom-right panel shows
the same correlation for the Great Moderation period 1984:1–2008:1.
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Figure 5: Top-left panel: Historical nominal interest rate (solid line) and counterfactual nominal
rate (circled line). Top-right panel: Historical measured inflation (solid line) and counterfactual true
inflation (circled line). Bottom-left panel: Historical measured output (solid line) and counterfactual
true output (circled line). Bottom-right panel: Historical sequences of ut, at, gt and µt shocks. Interest
rates and inflation rates are annual rates. Output and shocks are percentage deviation from trend.
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z var(zm − z) var(zm − zm) var(zm − z) 2cov(zm − zm, zm − z) var(zm−z)
var(zm)
Yˆt 0.126 0.179 0.160 −0.212 0.226
pˆit 1.191 0.992 0.065 0.134 1.084
Table 1: Output and Inflation Differentials.
Output is percentage deviation from steady-state. Inflation is annual rate, and all numbers are
rounded. The alternative partition, zm − z = (zm − z) + (z − z), delivers similar results.
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